Plainly, and only what is true today. Where something is not in place, it says so rather than leaving the gap for you to find.
Isolation is enforced by the database, not by the application. Every table carries row-level security tied to your workspace membership, so a query that forgot a filter returns nothing rather than somebody else’s rows. The dashboard reads under your own session for exactly that reason — the database decides, and application code cannot quietly widen it.
Direct Postgres access is disallowed from every external address. The connection host was never a secret — it ships in every browser bundle — so the password was the only thing standing between the open internet and a role that bypasses row-level security. It is now unreachable regardless.
Paddle is the merchant of record. Card details are entered on Paddle’s own checkout and never reach our servers, our logs or our database. What we store is a subscription id and a plan name.
When you connect a social account, the tokens are encrypted with AES-256-GCM in the application before they are written, and they live in a table with row-level security enabled and no policy at all — so no session can read it, only the server itself. A leaked backup is ciphertext rather than a set of live logins.
A visitor’s id is a one-way hash of a rotating salt, the date, the address and the browser string, so it changes every day and cannot be reversed. The raw IP address is never stored. Location is the country and nothing finer.
Sign-in is handled by Supabase Auth: passwords are hashed with bcrypt and we never receive the plaintext. Reset links are single-use and expire. You can sign in with Google instead and have no password with us at all.
A key is shown once when you create it. What the database holds is a SHA-256 of it, so a copy of our database is a list of hashes rather than a list of working keys. Keys are read-only, scoped to one workspace, rate limited, and revocable from the dashboard.
No SOC 2 report, no ISO 27001 certificate, no penetration-test letter, and no two-factor authentication on accounts yet. Those are real gaps rather than omissions from this page. Linksembly is run by one small business; if any of them is a requirement for you, say so before you buy rather than after.
If you find a way to reach data that is not yours, tell us before telling anyone else and we will fix it and credit you if you want to be credited. There is no bounty programme and no legal threat either — write to linksembly@linksembly.cloud with enough detail to reproduce it. We answer.
What we ask in return: do not run automated scanners against the live site, do not read or change other people’s data beyond what proves the point, and give us a chance to ship a fix before publishing.
See also the Privacy Notice for what is collected and who processes it.